The Question
Look at a satellite dish and you might assume the internet lives in the sky. It does not. When you stream a film from another continent or wire money overseas, the data almost never goes up to space. It goes down — to the bottom of the ocean, into a bundle of glass fibres wrapped in steel and tar, laid across the seabed by ships that have been doing this quietly since the age of the telegraph.
About 99% of the world's intercontinental data moves through roughly 500 to 600 submarine cables. In deep water, a cable can be as slim as a garden hose. Across those thin threads runs the machinery of modern civilisation: international payments and trading, the internet between continents, cloud services, military communications, the lot. The question is no longer academic. As these cables are cut — sometimes by accident, increasingly by suspicion of sabotage — governments are asking a blunt question: who guards the strings the whole world hangs from?
What the Evidence Shows
Cables break constantly. According to the International Cable Protection Committee, about 150 to 200 submarine telecom cable faults occur worldwide each year, and 70% to 80% are caused by accidental human activity such as fishing and ships' anchors. TeleGeography counted an average of 199 faults a year between 2010 and 2023 — nearly four a week. Natural causes such as undersea landslides account for some of the rest. The system is built to cope. Traffic reroutes automatically, and specialised repair ships splice the break. That resilience is real — but it depends on there being enough spare cables and enough ships, and both assumptions are now under strain.
What changed the conversation was a run of incidents that looked less like accidents. In 2023, the Balticconnector gas pipeline and a nearby data cable in the Baltic Sea were damaged, with investigators pointing to a ship's dragging anchor. Through late 2024 and early 2025, more Baltic cables were severed — at least 11 between October 2023 and January 2025 — and attention turned to a "shadow fleet" of ageing tankers; Finland accused one carrying Russian oil of damaging the Estlink 2 power cable and telecom lines by dragging its anchor in December 2024. In the Red Sea, three cables were cut in 2024 during the period of Houthi attacks on shipping, and in September 2025 damage to the SMW4 and IMEWE systems near Jeddah slowed internet traffic across the Middle East and South Asia, with Microsoft warning of higher latency on its Azure cloud. And in 2022, a volcanic eruption near Tonga severed the island nation's single cable, cutting the country off from the internet for weeks — a stark demonstration of what one broken thread can do.
"We will do everything in our power to make sure that we fight back, that we are able to see what is happening and then take the next steps to make sure that it doesn't happen again. And our adversaries should know this."
— NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, launching the Baltic Sentry mission, January 2025The defenders are outnumbered. The worldwide fleet of cable-repair ships is small and ageing: a 2025 industry study warned that about two-thirds of cable maintenance vessels will reach the end of their working lives by 2040, while the number of repairs needed is expected to rise. Building and crewing new ones takes years. Satellite systems like Starlink can carry emergency traffic and reconnect a cut-off island, but they cannot come close to the sheer volume the seabed carries — the physics of radio simply does not scale to the internet's full weight. Meanwhile the landing stations where cables come ashore are themselves chokepoints: a handful of buildings on a handful of beaches, each one a single point of failure.
An enemy no longer needs to cross your border. It only needs to drag an anchor across your ocean floor.
Why This Is Happening
The stakes finally became impossible to ignore. For decades, cables were treated as a private matter for telecom companies — laid, insured, and repaired quietly. The Baltic and Red Sea incidents dragged them onto the front page and into defense ministries. When ministers realised that a single ship could sever the nerves of the economy in international waters, cable protection stopped being a commercial footnote and became a security priority.
Deterrence is cheap for the attacker and expensive for the defender. Dropping an anchor "by accident" is deniable, low-cost, and hard to prosecute. Patrolling thousands of miles of open sea is none of those things. That asymmetry is exactly what pushes governments to formalise protection — sensor networks on the seabed, patrol patterns, and legal frameworks that turn a "dragged anchor" into an act with real consequences.
The military response is already taking shape. NATO has set up a dedicated centre at its maritime command to coordinate protection of undersea infrastructure, and in January 2025 it launched Baltic Sentry, a mission using frigates, patrol aircraft and naval drones whose rules can allow suspect ships to be boarded. In February 2025 the European Union adopted an action plan on cable security covering prevention, detection, repair and deterrence. Individual nations are acting too: the United Kingdom brought a specialised surveillance ship, RFA Proteus, into service in 2023 to watch pipelines and cables.
What Could Happen
Most major economies write undersea infrastructure into their defense doctrine. Navies run escort and patrol missions near critical routes, seabed sensor networks watch for approaching ships, and new repair vessels are commissioned. International talks begin on treaties that make deliberate cable cutting a defined hostile act.
Instead of heavy militarisation, the world simply builds far more cables and repair ships, plus a stronger satellite backup layer. Cuts still happen, but so much slack exists that no single break matters. Defense stays involved but in a supporting role, and the crisis fades into an engineering problem rather than a strategic one.
Several cables are cut at once in a clearly deliberate strike, taking a region partly offline and shaking financial markets. Governments respond with rushed naval deployments, emergency spending, and open confrontation at sea. This is the alarming path — real, but less likely than the steady, deliberate build-up already under way.
What Can We Do
Most of this plays out at the level of navies and treaties, far above any individual. But the pressure to act, and the resilience of your own life, are things you can influence.
Understand your own dependence before a cut teaches you. Your bank, your employer, your medical records, and your government all rely on data crossing the ocean. Knowing that a single physical thread underlies "the cloud" changes how you think about backups, cash reserves, and local alternatives.
Back investment in redundancy, not just security theatre. The cheapest protection is more cables, more repair ships, and more diverse routes — so that no single cut matters.
Push for clear international rules on undersea sabotage. Right now, cutting a cable in international waters sits in a legal grey zone. Tell representatives you want treaties that define deliberate damage as a hostile act with real penalties.
Keep an offline fallback for the essentials. If your region depends on one or two cables, an outage can last days. Keep some cash, downloaded documents, and a plan for communicating locally.
- International Cable Protection Committee — Media enquiries: cable faults and repairs
- TeleGeography — Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks
- TeleGeography — Do submarine cables account for over 99% of intercontinental data traffic?
- Defense News (AP) — 11 Baltic cables damaged in 15 months, pushing NATO to boost security, January 2025
- Marine Insight — NATO launches mission Baltic Sentry
- Al Jazeera — Internet disruptions in Middle East and South Asia after Red Sea cable cuts, September 2025
- SMEC — Valentia Island Symposium 2026: cable maintenance vessel outlook (PDF)