The Question

A shipping tanker at anchor at dusk, silhouetted against an industrial oil terminal

A sanction is, at bottom, an act of financial exclusion: a government forbids its citizens and companies — and often those of allied states — from doing business with a targeted country, firm, or person. Because so much of world trade and finance still flows through Western banks and the US dollar, being cut off can be crippling. Over the past two decades, sanctions have become the go-to tool of Western statecraft, deployed against adversaries large and small as a middle path between doing nothing and going to war.

The great test case arrived after February 2022. Responding to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, and their partners imposed more than 20,000 individual sanctions — freezing assets, banning technology exports, capping oil revenues, and cutting major banks off from global finance. It was the most sweeping economic campaign ever mounted against a major economy. The question this forecast weighs is uncomfortable for those who wield the tool: what happens when the West's favorite weapon is fired at full force, and the target does not fall?

What the Evidence Shows

Begin with the headline result. Despite the unprecedented barrage, the International Monetary Fund recorded that Russia's economy grew — by roughly 3 to 4 percent in both 2023 and 2024. The pain was real: lost technology, a drained talent pool, and an economy bent toward war production. But collapse did not come. Moscow redirected its oil exports from Europe to buyers in India and China, assembled a "shadow fleet" of tankers to move crude outside Western insurance and shipping, and evaded the G7's price cap designed to squeeze its revenues. The weapon struck hard and the target stayed standing.

Nor is Russia the only case. Iran has lived under heavy sanctions for years; Venezuela and North Korea for longer still. In none of them did economic pressure topple the government it was meant to weaken. Sanctions imposed real hardship on ordinary citizens and constrained each state's options — but as instruments of regime change or policy reversal, their record is thin. The lesson recurs: sanctions can impose costs, yet determined governments can absorb, adapt to, and endure them.

"Sanctions can raise the cost of a policy without changing it — imposing pain is not the same as compelling a decision."

— Recurring finding across sanctions research, 2023–2025

The deeper risk is what overuse provokes. Frozen Russian central-bank reserves — some 300 billion dollars held in Western institutions — set off a fierce debate over whether they could be seized outright, a step that would signal to every government that reserves parked in the West are hostages in waiting. That fear accelerates "de-dollarization": the slow effort to trade and hold wealth outside the US currency. China has expanded its own cross-border payment network, CIPS, as an alternative to Western channels, and BRICS members increasingly settle trade in local currencies. Secondary sanctions — penalties on third countries that keep dealing with a target — extend the West's reach but strain ties even with partners who resent being told whom they may trade with.

"Fire the weapon often enough, and rivals stop standing in its line — they build a different battlefield."

Why This Is Happening

Sanctions are cheap for the sender and easy to reach for. Compared with military force, a sanction costs little in lives or treasure and can be announced in a day. That convenience makes it the default response to almost any provocation. But a tool used constantly loses its shock value, and targets learn to plan for it in advance — hardening their economies against a blow they now expect.

Large economies can adapt in ways small ones cannot. A major oil exporter with willing buyers and a big domestic market has room to reroute trade, substitute suppliers, and wait out pressure. The very size that makes a country worth sanctioning also gives it the resilience to endure the sanction. Against a giant like Russia, exclusion from Western markets hurts — but it does not sever the country from the world.

Every use teaches rivals to build alternatives. This is the self-defeating logic at the heart of the tool. The more the West wields access to the dollar and its financial system as a weapon, the greater the incentive for others to construct payment networks, currency arrangements, and trade routes beyond its reach. Each sanction that bites also advertises the value of an exit — and rivals are steadily building the doors.


What Could Happen

Gradual erosion as workarounds mature Most likely

Sanctions stay a favored tool but grow less decisive as targets and their partners refine evasion, alternative payment systems, and local-currency trade. The West keeps imposing them and keeps landing blows, but the days of a sanction reliably bending a major adversary fade.

Smarter, coordinated sanctions regain bite Possible

Tighter enforcement, broader coalitions, and better-targeted measures — hitting enablers and evasion networks rather than whole economies — restore some of the tool's effectiveness, at least against states without a great-power patron to shelter them.

A rival financial bloc breaks the leverage Less likely

De-dollarization and alternative networks reach the point where a significant share of world trade routes around Western finance entirely, sharply blunting sanctions as a weapon and splitting the global economy into competing systems.

Our Assessment
We assign 71% probability — likely that by 2035 sanctions will be visibly losing their power as adversaries build parallel financial systems. The Russia case showed a major economy absorbing the largest sanctions campaign in history, and every use of the tool sharpens rivals' incentive to route around it. The uncertainty is pace and completeness: alternative systems remain immature, and sharper, better-coordinated sanctions could still bite hard against smaller targets. But the long-run trend points toward a weapon that grows louder and less decisive at the same time.

What Can We Do

A trading-floor display board showing multiple world currencies against the US dollar

Sanctions sound like a matter for treasuries and diplomats, yet they shape the price of energy, the reach of the dollar, and the odds of war versus peace. Understanding them is not just for specialists.

Know what a sanction can and cannot do. Grasp the difference between imposing economic pain and actually changing a government's behavior. Citizens who understand that gap are harder to sell on the idea that sanctions are a costless substitute for a real strategy — or that their failure means the West is powerless.

Watch the workarounds, not just the announcements. The shadow fleets, alternative payment networks, and local-currency deals reveal more about a sanction's real effect than the press release announcing it. Following the evasion tells you whether the pressure is biting or merely being rerouted.

Weigh the second-order costs. Every sanction carries a hidden bill: the incentive it gives rivals to abandon Western finance. Support a debate that treats sanctions as a serious instrument with real limits, rather than a reflex to be reached for at every provocation.

Follow the credible trackers. The IMF, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Atlantic Council's Global Sanctions Dashboard, and the Congressional Research Service publish careful, non-partisan analysis of what sanctions actually achieve. Reading them beats trusting either triumphant or dismissive headlines.

Sources
  • IMF — World Economic Outlook, 2024–2025
  • Peterson Institute for International Economics — sanctions research, 2025
  • Atlantic Council — Global Sanctions Dashboard, 2025
  • Congressional Research Service — sanctions overviews, 2025
  • Chatham House — economic statecraft analysis, 2025
  • Forecast The World Research Desk — 800+ data sources